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Mathematicians often refer to certain pieces of mathematics using words like beautiful, 
elegant, cumbersome, or ugly. Such references appear in discussions, in teaching contexts 
and in the literature, especially the non-technical literature. However, serious, more 
rigorous investigation of ‘mathematical beauty’ is much less common; it even seems that 
mathematicians are mostly off-duty when they speak of mathematical beauty. Here I 
intend to adopt a ‘serious’ approach: the aim of this work is to develop an aesthetic 
theory that accounts for aesthetic judgements in mathematics. In this work I do not 
attempt to underline the importance of mathematical beauty or to show the reader 
instances of it1. Nor do I attempt to justify the fact that the use of terms like ‘beautiful’ or 
‘elegant’ coincides with the general precepts of the mathematical discipline. I believe that 
when mathematicians talk about mathematical beauty they are still being ‘serious’ 
mathematicians. Assuming this is no simple matter, however. 
When mathematicians employ the word ‘beauty’ to qualify a theory, for example, 
people unacquainted with mathematics can surely find this usage strange. Beauty in 
mathematics seems to differ from the beauty we encounter in our everyday life. In these 
circumstances, we are perfectly justified to ask: what do mathematicians mean when they 
talk about beauty? I intend to answer this question. I intend to defend the position that 
judgements of beauty in mathematics are genuine aesthetic judgements. How I intend to 
defend this position is more complicated: I shall develop a theoretical framework that 
accounts for mathematical aesthetics in the same fashion as it account for ‘regular’ 
aesthetics. My answer to the question above is thus almost trivial: what mathematicians 
do when they talk about beauty is to express genuine aesthetic reactions. To ground this 
answer I interpret aesthetic terms as follows: the term ‘beautiful’ (and other aesthetic 
terms), in addition to referring to the property of being beautiful, has the function of 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 4 I analyze three examples of mathematical beauty. However, the purpose of that analysis is to 
show how the theory proposed in Chapter 3 can be applied, not to show the beauty of those items.  There is 
a large body of literature that accomplishes the display of mathematical beauty much better than this work. 
A few examples are: Nahin (1998), Nahin (2006), Le Lionnais (2004), Wells (1990). 
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elucidating to ourselves and to our interlocutors the subjective state caused in us by the 
object qualified as beautiful2.  
Hence, I shall defend the more specific claim that aesthetic judgements are 
characterized by two things: their conditions of application and their role in our 
experiencing objects and properties. The conditions of application depend on the person’s 
subjective state. The role, or rather the roles, that aesthetic judgements play are to 
elucidate subjective experience and to communicate the results of this elucidation. For 
example, when a mathematician qualifies a proof as beautiful, his description ‘this proof 
is beautiful’ conveys the information that the proof possesses the property of being 
beautiful. But more importantly, the uttering of this description helps the mathematician 
to clarify and identify his subjective state as an affective state similar to the states we 
experience in normal occurrences of beauty. Chapter 3 is devoted to an explication of all 
this in detail. 
The broad aim of this thesis is thus to provide an interpretation of aesthetic terms 
(words like beautiful, elegant, ugly, etc.) and judgements which accounts for their use in 
mathematics in the same manner as it accounts for their ‘normal’ use: the aim is to justify 
the literal interpretation of mathematical aesthetic judgements. 
My central proposal is that the key to this interpretation is to approach the subject 
of aesthetics from a systemic perspective: from this perspective, things like aesthetic 
pleasure, aesthetic experience or aesthetic judgements, are elements that interact with 
each other, forming a larger system. This system is an aesthetic-process and its 
development involves objects, subjects, social interaction and historical and cultural 
influences. The idea of aesthetic-process serves to flesh out an aesthetic theory. 
Now, non-literal approaches to aesthetic terms in mathematics, approaches that 
re-interpret the term ‘mathematical beauty’, can be found in the literature, and they 
illuminate important aspects of mathematical beauty. Metaphorical uses of aesthetic 
terms exist. Sometimes mathematicians (or scientists in general) intend to emphasize the 
heuristic or practical importance of certain pieces of mathematics by using references to 
beauty. In these cases the word beauty is a metaphor that refers to a general kind of 
virtue, not necessarily an aesthetic quality. Richard Feynman, for example, has referred to 
                                                 
2 I call this function of aesthetic terms articulation. 
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Euler’s formula3 as “the most remarkable formula of mathematics – our jewel” 
(Feynman, Leighton and Sands, 1963, p. 23). Although an aesthetic interpretation of this 
statement is possible, I believe that a different, non aesthetic, interpretation of it is equally 
plausible. Euler’s formula has enormous repercussions in fields like engineering or 
applied physics. The word ‘jewel’ can refer, so to speak, to the ‘economic’ value of a 
jewel. We can contrast this with a more obvious and explicitly literal use of aesthetic 
terms by Bertrand Russell: “Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but 
supreme beauty — a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture” (Russell, 2004, p. 
47). 
The distinction between literal and non-literal approaches is more evident when 
seen from our 21st century point of view. Earlier historical periods, however, did not 
distinguish so sharply between what we nowadays know as scientific and artistic 
disciplines. It is well known that for Pythagoreans the harmonic nature of the world was 
clearly manifested in numbers as well as in music. Without a distinction between 
harmony in numbers and music, distinguishing between literal or non-literal 
interpretations of the term ‘harmony’ makes no sense; the same can be said, I believe, of 
the term ‘beauty’. During the middle ages, scientific education also incorporated this 
relationship: music, along with arithmetic, geometry and astronomy formed the 
quadrivium: the group of scientific subjects taught in mediaeval universities, after the 
literary education of the trivium which consisted of grammar, dialectic (logic) and 
rhetoric. The inclusion of music among the scientific disciplines was not arbitrary; it was 
grounded on a conception of knowledge. The Greek philosopher Proclus Lycaeus (412-
485) dealt with the subjects of the quadrivium by explicating them based on the notion of 
quantity; for Proclus the quadrivium’s subjects were mathematical subjects (Gow, 2004). 
By dissociating discrete from continuous quantity, Proclus believed that an arithmetical 
fact had its analogue in geometry and vice versa; and that a musical fact had its analogue 
in astronomy and vice versa. The subjects were characterized as follows: Arithmetic is 
                                                 
3 In technical works the expression eiπ=cos x +i sin x is referred to as Euler’s formula and the special case 
e
iπ
=-1, or equivalently eiπ+1=0 , is referred to as Euler’s identity (Weisstein 2003, p. 952). However, in 
their papers on mathematical beauty David Wells and Francois Le Lionnais call  eiπ=-1  Euler’s formula. 
Since Wells and Le Lionais are frequently cited here, providing examples of mathematical beauty, I follow 
their convention and I refer to eiπ=-1 as Euler’s Formula. I shall reiterate this clarification when needed. 
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discrete quantity at rest. Geometry is continuous quantity at rest. Music is continuous 
quantity in motion. Astronomy is discrete quantity in motion (Gow, 2004, pp. 71-72). 
The 6th century philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480–524 or 
525) was the one who introduced the word ‘quadrivium’, which means four-fold path 
(Marenbon, 2003, p.14). He translated Euclid and Ptolemy’s texts that were used in the 
teaching of the quadrivium in mediaeval universities. Boethius wrote his own treatise on 
music, the “Principles of Music”. He distinguished three types of music: instrumental, 
human and cosmic, all of which involved the study of harmonic ratios. Boethius was not 
concerned with the practice of music but with its principles, something roughly similar to 
what we call music theory nowadays, except that these principles embodied “ideal 
structures of the world” (Marenbon, 2003, p.15). Boethius believed that human beings 
find a natural joy in music, and he linked this fact to Plato’s view that the world is 
structured according to musical intervals. He also endorsed Plato’s view of the power that 
music has to change people’s moods and behaviour. As to Proclus, music to Boethius is a 
mathematical subject, and yet music is characterized by the same features we attribute to 
it today: the power to deliver enjoyment and affect our emotions. To Boethius there 
seems to be no conflict, but rather a natural link between beauty and mathematics. There 
was no need for a re-interpretation of mathematical beauty. 
The gap between music and mathematics deepened as the systems of arts and 
sciences began to develop into the two contrasting fields we know today. The 
Renaissance and Modernity granted less importance to the aesthetic aspects of 
mathematics. At the same time, aesthetic problems began to be seen as independent of 
cognitive activities; the birth of modern aesthetics is characterized by the introduction of 
the view that the phenomena related to our perceptions of beauty are independent of any 
practical or cognitive concerns (Guyer, 2004). As the empirical component of knowledge 
gained importance in science and its power of description and prediction was notably 
enhanced by mathematics, mathematics became more closely linked to the other sciences. 
Mathematics’ old relationship with music lost relevance. By the end of the 19th century 




The relation between mathematics and beauty would not be investigated for some 
time. The peculiarities of mathematics, a formal discipline with no relation to empirical 
events and governed solely by logic, posed the most serious difficulties for philosophers 
at the end of the 19th century. Gottlob Frege, for example, considered that arithmetic and 
games of chess were very alike: 
An arithmetic with no thought as its content will also be without possibility of application. Why 
can no application be made of a configuration of chess pieces? Obviously because it expresses no 
thought. Why can arithmetic equations be applied? Only because they express thoughts. How 
could we possibly apply an equation which expressed  nothing and was nothing more than a group 
of figures, to be transformed into another group of figures in accordance with certain rules? Now, 
it is the applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of science. So 
applicability necessarily belongs to it (Frege, 1903, p. 291). 
 
A purely formalist approach to mathematics does not allow us to justify the place of 
mathematics among the sciences. This is a worrying picture for anyone who regards 
mathematics as a serious discipline. Frege concluded that it is applicability which 
elevates arithmetic from a game to a science. 
Mathematical beauty seems a frivolous concern when urgent issues like the 
scientific status of mathematics are at hand. If mathematical beauty is to be addressed, a 
serious mathematician should address it in such a way that it does not compromise the 
scientific character of mathematics; this concern, I believe, would explain why 
contemporary mathematicians might be interested in interpreting mathematical beauty in 
terms of scientific precepts. Gian-Carlo Rota (Rota, 1997), offers a notorious example of 
a scientific-character-preserving approach to mathematical beauty. Rota believes that 
when a mathematician employs the term ‘mathematical beauty’, he is actually referring to 
the objective property of being enlightening, of giving us a deeper understanding: 
mathematical beauty is still a ‘serious’ business. 
However, another trend gained appeal during the 20th century: the divide between 
scientific and aesthetic concerns began to be questioned; we witnessed attempts to make 
reason and beauty meet again. Nelson Goodman (Goodman, 1968), for example, 
proposed that cognitive processes play an important role in aesthetic appreciation. Susan 
Langer (Langer, 1942) addressed music by analyzing topics like language, abstraction, 
14 
 
and knowledge. Some authors in the philosophy of science have also shown an interest in 
the topic of beauty in science. James McAllister (McAllister, 1996) developed a 
rationalist picture of scientific change based on the evolution of aesthetic canons through 
a mechanism that he called aesthetic induction. Theo Kuipers (Kuipers, 2002), when 
further developing the idea of aesthetic induction, explored the idea that beauty can play a 
role in the scientific search for truth. 
A rapprochement between aesthetics and mathematics can also be found among 
mathematicians. François Le Lionnais (Le Lionnais, 1948), for example, resorts to the 
history of art to illustrate different kinds of mathematical beauty. He considers that 
beauty appears in every branch of knowledge but nowhere with more force than in 
mathematics. Le Lionnais endorses a literal approach to mathematical beauty: “Has not 
the Western world confirmed the opinion of ancient Greece which up to the time of 
Euclid considered mathematics more an art than a science?” (Le Lionnais, 2004, p. 121). 
He presents an interesting list of authors who enthusiastically expressed their aesthetic 
views on mathematics. But, even more importantly, Le Lionnais recognizes the need to 
deal with the subject in a more rigorous manner, not just by remarking and showing the 
existence of mathematical beauty: 
If some great mathematicians have known how to give lyrical expression to their enthusiasm for 
the beauty of their science, nobody has suggested examining it as if it were the object of an art –
mathematical art– and consequently the subject of a theory of aesthetics, the aesthetics of 
mathematics (Le Lionnais, 2004, p. 122). 
 
Le Lionnais emphasizes that there is much work to do to accomplish an aesthetics of 
mathematics; his own study “has no intention of establishing [an aesthetics of 
mathematics]; it aspires only to prepare the way for it” (Le Lionnais, 2004, p. 122). Le 
Lionnais is not only a supporter of a literal interpretation of mathematical beauty; he also 
favours the development of a more rigorous approach to an aesthetic theory, not just 
resigning ourselves to pre-theoretical displays of enthusiasm. If we take Le Lionnais 
seriously, then an aesthetics of mathematics must not only address mathematical beauty 
in a literal way, but also in a fully theoretical way.  
Now, pre-theoretical approaches cannot be considered as accounts of 
mathematical beauty, but they can illuminate aspects of it. For example, Russell’s 
 15 
 
analogy comparing mathematical beauty to sculpture gives us the rough idea that 
mathematical beauty is contemplative, related, perhaps, to the static character of abstract 
mathematical objects. Many pre-theoretical approaches are just brief remarks 
accompanying non-technical works. Paul J. Nahin (Nahin, 2006), for example, comments 
very briefly that he considers mathematical beauty as related to the fact that mathematics 
is disciplined reasoning:  
The reason I think that Einstein’s theory is still beautiful (despite currently being replaced by 
quantum-mechanics-compatible equations), is that it is the result of disciplined reasoning. Einstein 
created new physics.., but [his] work was done while satisfying certain severe restrictions ... a 
theory that satisfies such a broad constraints must, I think, be beautiful. (Nahin, 2006, p. xix). 
 
Le Lionnais’s ideas are more theoretically developed. He distinguishes between 
‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ (Le Lionnais, 2004) beauty in mathematical propositions and 
methods. According to Le Lionnais a piece of mathematics possesses classical beauty 
“when we are impressed by its austerity or its mastery over diversity, and even more so 
when it combines these two characteristics in a harmoniously arranged structure” (Le 
Lionnais, 2004, p. 124). Regularity is the property more clearly associated with Le 
Lionnais’ classical beauty. He thinks that the geometry of the triangle, cycloids and the 
logarithmic spiral exemplify classical beauty. In contrast, a piece of mathematics 
possesses romantic beauty when its beauty consists in the “glorification of violent 
emotion, non-conformism and eccentricity” (Le Lionnais, 2004, p. 130). The notion of 
asymptote, complex numbers, and Cantor’s notion of infinity are some examples of 
romantic beauty. Le Lionnais’s approach in terms of the art-historical distinction between 
classical and romantic4 beauty is certainly interesting and more theoretically developed; 
but I believe it has important limitations: it deals with mathematical beauty not by 
offering an explication of aesthetic phenomena in mathematics, but by dealing with 
mathematics as an art; it resorts to the history of art rather than to an aesthetic theory. The 
distinction between classical and romantic art refers to a difference in style; it does not 
                                                 
4 Western art movements are customarily classified by periods. Three of the most conspicuous pre-20th 
century periods are the Baroque, the Rococo or “Classical”, and the Romantic. Le Lionnais adopts the 
standard distinction between classical and romantic movements in history of art, but the baroque is missing 
from his discussion. He does not give a reason for that, thus, Le Lionnais’s approach seems to leave some 




refer to the nature of the aesthetic phenomenon but to some differences among classes of 
objects that embody that phenomenon. 
I think that the question of how to interpret what mathematicians mean when they 
use aesthetic expressions is best addressed in the context of an aesthetic theory that deals 
with more fundamental and general issues. Approaching mathematics as if it were an art 
seems to me a little like rushing matters. Perhaps it is better to start by addressing basic 
issues. This is precisely my intention: I shall develop the basis of an aesthetics of 
mathematics. To address this task it is a good idea to focus further on our problem and 
clarify the conceptual apparatus that will be employed to tackle it. 
Let us identify our task: I shall address the problem of giving a literal 
interpretation of aesthetic judgements in mathematics. Furthermore, I shall address this 
problem from the point of view of contemporary mathematical practice. This means that 
the mathematical beauty that is our subject matter is not the beauty that the discipline as a 
whole possesses, as a result of, for example, mathematics being a rigorous or disciplined 
endeavour. Rather, I shall deal with the phenomena involved in mathematician’s 
judgements, like ‘Cantor’s notion of infinity is beautiful’ or ‘proofs by exhaustion are 
cumbersome’. I accept mathematicians’ judgements and assume that beauty, ugliness, 
elegance, etc. are properties of some pieces of mathematics. Some pieces are beautiful, 
but some others are ugly, elegant, aesthetically neutral, etc. Hence, in addition to beauty, 
things like ugliness or elegance are also part of the subject matter of this work. 
Let us now clarify the conceptual apparatus that will be employed. Two elements 
are relevant here: the theoretical tenets that will be endorsed and the methodologies that 
will be employed. I consider that a healthy trend in contemporary philosophy and 
aesthetics is that they no longer distance themselves from natural science. My approach 
will thus cohere as much as possible with empirical findings. I aim to be consistent with 
science, and, when no scientific results are available, to employ a scientifically informed 
common sense. Philosophically, this work sympathizes with analytic philosophy’s 
commitment to precision, thoroughness and conceptual rigour, and thus with methods 
like formalization and conceptual analysis. Despite this, due to the fact that mathematical 
aesthetic experience will be addressed here in a detailed way for the very first time (as far 
as I know), it remains difficult to achieve its theoretical development or to engage in 
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rigorous analytic discussion. My approach to aesthetic experience is thus descriptive 
(after all, any theory or discussion must start somewhere). 
Within this framework I shall tackle the task of providing a literal interpretation of 
aesthetic judgements in mathematics by proposing an aesthetic theory that allows us to 
interpret mathematical aesthetic judgement as bona fide aesthetic judgements. The 
aesthetic theory I propose interprets aesthetic events as elements of aesthetic processes. 
The working of such processes will be explicated by presenting accounts of three central 
topics: aesthetic experience, aesthetic value and aesthetic judgement. 
Now, the ideas that help to develop this theory have been borrowed from several 
sources. Insights, concepts and theories of authors working in aesthetics, philosophy of 
mathematics and philosophy of science will be employed in various ways: Peter Kivy’s 
account of musical appreciation and Jenefer Robinson’s theories on emotion and 
expression have provided inspiration for my approach to aesthetic experience and the 
aesthetic as aesthetic-process. Gian-Carlo Rota’s insights about mathematical beauty are 
incorporated as part of my interpretation of aesthetic mathematical intentional object. 
James McAllister’s account of the evolution of aesthetic preferences has been borrowed 
to develop my account of the evolution of aesthetic value. The theoretical aesthetic 
approaches of Isabel Hungerland and Peter Kivy on aesthetic terms, Nelson Goodman on 
metaphor and Alan Goldman on aesthetic value are used to develop my theoretical 
accounts of aesthetic terms, descriptions, judgement and value in the context of an 
aesthetic-process. In particular, Kivy and Robinson’s works provide a valuable 
perspective from the point of view of aesthetics and, more importantly, inspiration on 
how to address some issues (Kivy’s formalism inspires my analysis of experience and 
Robinson’s emotions-as-processes theory inspires my idea of aesthetic-process). Rota’s, 
McAllister’s and Hungerland’s ideas are incorporated into my approach in a more direct 
way, as their accounts of the role of knowledge, the dynamics of preferences, and the role 
of aesthetic terms form the point of departure of my own accounts. Perhaps a broader 






Summary of Chapters: 
Chapters 1 and 2 present background discussions and surveys: there we find valuable 
insights into topics like beauty in mathematics and science, musical formalism, emotions 
and expression in art. Chapter 3 is the core of the work, it contains my proposal for an 
aesthetic theory for mathematics; Chapter 4 tests the theory by applying it to concrete 
examples. 
In Chapter 1 I examine theoretical approaches to beauty in mathematics and 
science. I begin by surveying the work of two early 18th century authors: Lord 
Shaftesbury (Shaftesbury, 1711) and Francis Hutchenson (Hutchenson, 1738). 
Shaftesbury addresses beauty in numbers using the idea that order is the principle of 
beauty. For Hutchenson beauty is an idea that is aroused in our minds by the property of 
uniformity amidst variety; this principle accounts for the beauty of theorems.  The 
common problem with these accounts is that they lead one to conclude that every 
mathematical item is beautiful. However, mathematicians would agree that there is ugly 
mathematics; there are elegant as well as clumsy proofs, for example. Although 
illuminating, Shaftesbury’s and Hutchenson’s approaches do not really address the notion 
of mathematical beauty as it is employed by mathematicians. I thus turn to the ideas of 
the mathematician Gian-Carlo Rota (Rota, 1997), who claims that ‘mathematical beauty’ 
is a term mathematicians employ to refer to the enlightenment provided by some pieces 
of mathematics. I discuss some of the shortcomings of Rota’s non-literal approach. For 
example, this approach cannot account for the fact that mathematicians (experts in 
employing and introducing exotic terms and meanings) choose to employ the term 
‘beauty’ rather than a less confusing term. After listening to mathematicians I then turn to 
philosophy of science with a survey of James McAllister’s ideas (McAllister, 1996). 
McAllister interprets scientific change in terms of aesthetic canons rather than in terms of 
Kuhnian paradigms. McAllister’s most attractive insight is the idea of the aesthetic 
induction, which accounts for historical changes in aesthetic preferences: preferences for 
certain properties of scientific theories increase as a scientific community witnesses 
recurrent appearances of those properties in empirically adequate theories. Theo Kuipers 
(Kuipers, 2004) further substantiates aesthetic induction by interpreting it in terms of the 
mere exposure effect; which consists in the unconscious development of preferences for 
 19 
 
familiar stimuli rather than for unfamiliar ones. The problem with aesthetic induction in 
the work of both authors is that it renders a purely a posteriori view of aesthetic 
judgements. In such a picture all preferences seem to depend on past experiences. This 
approach neglects autonomic affective responses that do not depend on a process of 
‘learning’ responses; in emotions, for example. There are some other theoretical 
shortcomings to aesthetic induction; I use the work of the aestheticians Isabel Hungerland 
(Hungerland, 1962) and Peter Kivy (Kivy, 1975) on the problem of aesthetic terms to 
highlight the limitations of aesthetic induction as an aesthetic theory. This makes it clear 
that a consistent notion of aesthetic judgements in mathematics is in order (a subject to be 
addressed in Chapter 3).  
Chapter 2 surveys two central and complementary ideas in aesthetics: form and 
(the expression of) emotions. This chapter is less critical than Chapter 1; its main aim is 
to collect ideas and, especially, inspiration. The first part of the chapter is devoted to 
Peter Kivy’s musical formalism; the second part to Jenefer Robinson’s theories of 
emotions and expression. 
As we have seen, mathematics and music have enjoyed an old and close 
relationship; philosophy of music is thus a good place to look for clues as to how to 
address aesthetics in the highly formalized discipline of mathematics. Peter Kivy’s 
musical formalism5 (Kivy, 2002) is a rich source of ideas. Musical formalism is the view 
that the aesthetic value of music is determined by its form. In Kivy’s view, purely 
instrumental music consists in sound structures that can be seen as plots without content. 
He establishes an analogy between music and following a story; the active involvement 
of our intellect is central in the experience of music. The survey of Kivy’s ideas provides 
insights that I employ to develop my own approach: first, the very idea that form, rather 
than emotive content, plays a central role in musical experience6. For Kivy, music is the 
object that occupies the attention of the listener and the formal properties of this object is 
what characterizes music. Second, in musical experience intellectual activity plays an 
important function. Some of our pleasure in listening to music comes from the 
intellectual activities performed in the grasping of sound structures. In addition to Kivy’s 
                                                 
5 Kivy himself believes that the term ‘formalism’ is ill-chosen, but he accepts it, so I do, too. 
6 I propose my own interpretation of formalism, better suited to my approach: the function of form is to 
unify our aesthetic experience by providing a focus for our attention and causing affective reactions. 
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ideas, Rogers Scruton’s view on the ontology of music, that music occurs in a special 
kind of space, helps to inspire my treatment of mathematical items as intentional objects 
in a phenomenological space. 
Formalism is an approach that reacts to the idea that the expression of emotions is 
the aim of art. In order to complete our picture of aesthetic experience, in the second part 
of Chapter 2 I will survey Jenefer Robinson’s approach to expression of emotions in art. 
Jenefer Robinson’s (Robinson, 2004) theories of emotion and expression employ ideas 
from philosophy, cognitive psychology, and neurophysiology, offering an attractive 
synthesis of philosophical and empirical results. Robinson conceives of emotions as 
processes which involve psychological, physiological and behavioural events; this theory 
of emotion enables her to propose a theory of expression in art, which is that expression 
elucidates and individuates emotions in an imaginary character, a persona7: an object 
expresses an emotion when it can be interpreted as being deliberately designed to appear 
as evidence of the presence of an emotion. The survey of Robinson’s ideas has provided 
the following insights: her attention to empirical results in emotional phenomena provides 
some background to constrain (or, rather, to inform) my approach to aesthetic experience. 
Robinson’s theories serve to ground a useful relation between cognition and aesthetics by 
acknowledging the role of judgements and knowledge in emotion and its expression. 
Robinson’s approach to emotion as process integrates aspects of cognitive and non-
cognitive approaches to emotion; I borrow this process-approach to develop my aesthetic-
process approach, which attempts to integrate different aspects of the aesthetic in 
mathematics. Finally, the emphasis of Robinson’s expression theory on elucidation and 
individuation inspires my account of aesthetic judgements as articulators of aesthetic 
experience.  
The insights gained in chapters 1 and 2 lay the foundation for the development of 
my own account. Chapter 3 presents my proposal for an aesthetics of mathematics. Since 
mathematics is not a traditional subject of aesthetics, the best way of making up for this 
absence of a tradition is to offer a theoretical justification for the aesthetic character of 
mathematical aesthetic judgements, and to further substantiate the theory with an a 
posteriori justification by applying it to concrete cases. In Chapter 3 I propose the basics 
                                                 
7 Robinson does not attribute emotions to any concrete individual but to this imaginary person, the persona. 
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of an aesthetic theory which allows us to understand mathematical aesthetic judgements 
as literal aesthetic judgements. In short, my proposal is to see the different kinds of 
aesthetic things – such as aesthetic experience, aesthetic value, aesthetic descriptions, etc. 
– as related by the fact that they all are elements of a process in which objective 
properties, subjective reactions and social influences and contexts interact with each 
other; I call this process an aesthetic-process. This idea allows me to interpret the notion 
of ‘the aesthetic’ as a predicate that is applied meaningfully to the kinds of things that 
characteristically participate in aesthetic-processes. Aesthetic events should not be 
understood in isolation but as part of a process, of a system that develops by following 
different paths over different times. Among the events involved in an aesthetic-process I 
interpret three central ones: aesthetic experience, aesthetic value and aesthetic 
judgements. 
Aesthetic experience is interpreted as a process that involves changes in the focus 
and content of our attention and the eliciting of affective responses. Aesthetic experience, 
due to the very nature of experience, is a particularly difficult issue to address. Aesthetic 
judgements in mathematics can be identified by the public use of aesthetic terms, and 
aesthetic value can be inferred and (as we shall see in Chapter 3) ‘tracked’ by using 
public aesthetic judgement. But aesthetic experiences are private; this fact perhaps 
explains the absence of an analysis of it. As a result, my approach to aesthetic experience 
is almost completely descriptive rather than theoretical or analytical. 
Aesthetic value is interpreted as a relation between sets of properties and 
subjective reactions; its evolution is governed by a mechanism similar to aesthetic 
induction (I call it constrained aesthetic induction). Aesthetic judgements are interpreted 
as expressions of subjective states, characterized by the application of aesthetic terms, the 
role of which is to articulate aesthetic experience and to share the result of such 
articulation. 
This theory allows us to address the question ‘what do mathematicians mean 
when they talk about beauty?’ Mathematicians, as I anticipated, employ aesthetic terms in 
a literal sense, but their use is closer to the way aesthetic terms are used by specialists, 
critics or artists, rather than by a person in the street. Appreciation depends profoundly on 
a great deal of background mathematical knowledge. The theory allows us to reach our 
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final aim of interpreting aesthetic judgements in mathematics as follows: mathematical 
aesthetic judgements are articulated expressions of subjective states (aesthetic 
experiences) which result from an affective engagement of our attention to a 
mathematical item. The affective reaction reflects our preferences (our aesthetic values), 
which in turn are modulated by our natural tendencies and cultural influences 
(constrained aesthetic induction). 
Chapter 4 examines three examples of mathematical beauty. These examples 
serve to show how the theory developed in Chapter 3 can be applied. The first example 
addresses mathematical beauty by means of a very basic example proposed by Le 
Lionnais: the function y=ex. The second example addresses a more refined judgement. I 
analyze an elegant proof: Cantor’s diagonal argument. This example allows us to see how 
my ideas of aesthetic experience and articulation can account for the nuances involved in 
the application of the closely related notions of beauty and elegance. Finally, I address 
mathematical ugliness; by doing so we will have covered all the most relevant aesthetic 
terms employed in mathematics. I discuss the case of the computer-assisted proof of the 
four colour theorem. This example also serves to display the advantages of my systemic 
approach, since we shall see that aesthetic judgements in mathematics depend not only on 
inductive changes in value but also on changes in the nature of our experience. I also 
show that my theory is able to make predictions: I conjecture that computer-assisted 
proofs have little chance of being regarded as beautiful in the future, as has been 
conjectured by James McAllister (McAllister, 2005 pp. 28-29). 
I have also included five appendices which include complementary material that 
furthers the discussion of musical formalism and theories of emotion and expression in 
Chapter 2. Such appendices are not necessary to understand the main ideas of this work, 
but the curious reader can find interesting information in them. Appendices 2 and 5, in 
particular, are devoted to addressing the problem of providing a clearer notion of musical 
form, in a spirit similar to my idea of aesthetical mathematical intentional objects. 
Although these appendices are interesting as samples of earlier stages in the development 
of the ideas I endorse here, they are not necessary to understand them.  
 
 
